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Abstact
This paper discusses a framework for analyzing robust institutions for water markets drawn on the new
institutional economics school of thoughts which is based on Williamson, North, Coase and Ostrom
theories on transaction cost economics, property rights and collective actions. Based on these theories,
we review the evolution and development of water reforms and markets in countries such as Australia,
USA (California and Colorado), Chile and in Spain. Based on the lessons learned from the Spanish and
international experience on water markets, a list of robust recommendations for the improvement of
water markets in Spain is proposed. These include among others, not only the definition of secure water
rights, through the registration of rights or recognition of environment as a legitimate user, but also the
monitoring of water trading activities, including the collection of information for prices and quantities
or cost-benefit analysis for quantifying benefits and externalities. Finally, based on Sharma’s approach
(2012) a new robust water governance model for Spain is proposed in which the highest priority is
given to the role of legal and political institutions and second priority to environmental, economic and
social needs. We hope that the framework presented in this paper will function as a tool for researchers
and policy makers in Spain and other European countries to understand how water markets can be
further developed to be economically and environmentally efficient, and socially accepted.
Keywords: New Institutional Economics, Robust design principles, water governance, institutions,
water markets
JEL: B52, D23, Q25
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1. Introduction
Water markets have been developed around the world as an instrument to deal with water
scarcity problems and improve water allocation among users. Examples of countries where water
markets have been studied include USA, Australia, Chile, Spain, South Africa and China (for more
information see Mole and Berkoff, 2009; Grafton et al. 2010; Calatrava et al., 2012; and Zetland,
2011). There are different types of water markets which Calatrava et al. (2012) summarize as follows:
agricultural, i.e. transfer of water to high-value crops, inter-basin (exceptionally allowed and
controversial in Spain) and inter-sector, i.e. trade between users in different sectors such as
agricultural, urban, industrial/energy, environmental. Inter-sector water trading schemes have been
implemented in South-Western USA entailing water trading from agricultural to urban, in Australia
from agricultural to government with the purchase of water from farmers to comply with environmental
standards and recently in South Spain, from agricultural to energy. Other forms of water markets
include groundwater, involving trading of abstraction rights instead of water itself (e.g. the
establishment of national groundwater framework in Australia), and water supply options contracts by
virtue of which one user accepts to reserve a share of his quota and to sell it to other user who might
need it if certain conditions hold, for instance in drought periods.
As water markets in different countries function under different rules and mechanisms, it is
difficult to conclude about their advantages and disadvantages. However, WWF (2007) (cited in Rey et
al (2012)) attempts to summarise the main advantages of water markets in ensuring the allocation of
water to the highest value use, providing incentives to users for water preservation and making possible
additional water available for the environment without reducing the overall economic activity. On the
other hand, water markets are faced with some difficulties, substantially varying in transactional costs
and access to information due to discrepancies in income levels and access to capital. Other difficulties
which can affect the functioning of water markets include third party effects and the fact that water
markets for water rights are often not as active as spot markets.
Many past studies evaluated the costs and benefits from water trading schemes. For instance,
(Bjornlund, 2006) in Australia allocation markets have been used to manage uncertainty and risk within
and between seasons, while entitlement markets have been used to adjust irrigators' risk position in the
long term, resulting in subsequent use of the allocation market to manage this new risk position.
Furthermore, Brooks and Harris (2008) stated that water trading in Victoria’s Watermove program
generates substantial economic benefits, and the gains achieved might provide guidance on markets
2
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mechanisms for other countries. Efficiency gains in Watermove reflect the reallocation of water from
low to high valued uses, promoting structural adjustment in the agricultural sector as inefficient farmers
exit it. More recently, Zetland (2011) has provided an overview of the water markets for water quantity
and quality in Europe, which are underdeveloped due to difficulties in their implementation driven by
institutional constraints and high transaction costs. Adler (2009) underlined the importance of global
climate change and pressure on water resources and availability in the development of water markets.
The author stated that a gradual change toward water marketing and market pricing will improve the
management of water supplies, guarantee more efficient allocation of available supplies, and encourage
cost effective conservation measures, thereby mitigating the impact of climate change on supplies and
availability. However, Matthews (2004) argues that water markets do not function efficiently as water
property rights were not designed for market transactions. The author raises several issues regarding
the structure of a water right system driven by the experience in the western United States. Several
recommendations for understanding the structure of property rights include the separation of water
rights from land, registration of water rights for a certain period and well-specified rules for
transferable water rights. Another study by Grafton et al. (2010) employed an integrated framework to
assess and compare the institutional foundations, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability
of water markets in Australia, the western US, Chile, South Africa and China and suggested that
effective institutional arrangements and allocative mechanisms are of great importance for a wellfunctioning water market.
This paper discusses a framework for analysing robust institutions for water markets drawn on
the new institutional economics school of thoughts which is based on Williamson, North, Coase and
Ostrom theories on transaction cost economics, property rights and collective actions. Based on these
theories, we review the evolution and development of water reforms and markets in countries such as
Australia, USA, Chile, and in Spain. The reason for choosing these overseas countries is that there is
considerable empirical evidence and research on the evolution of water markers, which allows us to
identify costs and benefits, advantages and disadvantages of introducing and developing of water
markets. We chose Spain as our country of study from Europe due to the fact that the absence of robust
water governance and effective surveillance does not allow water markets to be efficient and socially
accepted (Garrido et al. 2012). Based on the lessons learned from the Spanish and international review
a list of robust recommendations for the improvement of water markets in Spain is provided, followed
by a discussion on the development of a robust water governance model based on Sharma’s approach
3
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(2012). Even limited in scope, the review will provide an important insight on how water markets have
been evolving so far and how they could be further developed to be environmentally, socially and
economically accepted.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief definition of the new institutional
economics approach followed by a discussion on the design of robust principles for governing
resources in a sustainable way. Section 3 provides an example of the application of such approaches in
the evolution of water markets in the Murray-Darling basin (Australia), in California and Colorado
(USA), Chile and in Tagus river basin (Spain). Section 4 discusses a list of robust recommendations for
improving water markets in Spain followed by the introduction of an effective water governance model
for this country. The final section concludes.

2. The New Institutional Economics Approach
2.1 Theory
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach builds of two schools of thoughts: the neoclassical economics and the institutional analysis. Under NIE, some of the unrealistic assumptions of
neo-classical economics (such as perfect information, zero transaction costs, full rationality) are
relaxed, but the assumption of self-seeking individuals attempting to maximize an objective function
subject to constraints still holds (Sharma, 2012, Libecap, 2006, Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001). The
additional constraint that NIE assumes is that institutions matter for economic performance. The
institutional analysis refers to a set of formal (e.g. laws, contracts, political systems, organizations,
markets, etc) and informal rules of conduct (e.g. traditions, norms, customs, sociological trends etc)
that facilitate coordination or govern relationships between individuals (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001).
Therefore, the NIE (Figure 1) suggests that economic activities are embedded in a framework of
informal and formal institutions, and its purpose is to explain the determinants of institutions and their
evolution over time, and to evaluate their impact on economic performance, efficiency and
distributions (Nabli and Nugent, 1989).

4
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NIE

Institutional analysis

Neoclassical
economics

Figure 1.The New Institutional Economics Approach

Being a multi-disciplinary approach, NIE has several branches (Figure 2). These expand from
new economic history and public choice & political economy (macro-level analysis) to transaction
economics, theory of collective action and law and economics (micro-analysis) (for a more
comprehensive definition of the NIE branches see Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001). Three components are
of great significance in the NIE approach and are the focus of this study: i) the transaction costs
economics, ii) property rights, and iii) collective actions. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of
screening and selecting a buyer or seller, the costs of negotiating, monitoring or enforcing a contract
(Coase, 1937) and, if ignored, can reduce the efficiency of economic activities. A major effect of good
institutions is therefore to reduce transaction costs. According to North (1997), the major challenge is
to evolve institutions in which firstly, the transaction costs are minimized and secondly, the incentives
favour cooperative solution, in which cumulative experiences and collective learning are best utilized
(Gandhi and Crase, 2009). In the same line of thinking with Coase and North, Williamson suggested
that a trade-off has to be made between the costs of coordination and hierarchy within an organization,
and the costs of transacting and forming contracts in the market. This trade-off will depend on the
magnitude of transaction costs (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001).
With transaction costs, property rights play an important role for efficiency. According to J.R.
Commons (1957) property rights define relationships among people regarding things (Schlager, 2005).
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) defined five types of property rights, the rights of access, i.e. to enter a
defined physical property, the rights of withdrawal, i.e. to obtain the products of a resource, the rights
of management, i.e. to regulate how to use and improve the resource, the rights of exclusion, i.e. to
determine who enters the resource, and the rights of transfer, i.e. to sell, lease, or leave the resource
5
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(Schlager, 2005). If property rights are not well defined then transaction costs can be high. As a result,
good institutions need to minimize the transaction costs of renegotiations so that a new level of
efficient equilibrium of resource-use can be achieved (Coase, 1960). The importance of property rights
in relation to specific goals in water management issues was underlined by Bruns et al. (2005). After
reviewing the water property rights reform in six countries, they concluded that the use of property
rights as tools for more equitable, sustainable, and efficient water management requires better
sequencing of reforms, redesigning institutions for participatory water governance, resolving tenure
rights, and developing equitable arrangements for regulating transfers.
Moreover, the NIE approach takes into account the theory of collective action mainly driven by
Ostrom’s work (1990). Ostrom (1990, 1994) underlined that the institutions and institutional structures
developed by individuals, groups and governments to organize human activities influence the outcome
of managing “common pool resources” (CPRs) (Biswas and Venkatachalam, 2010). Furthermore, new
institutional economic theories suggest that institutions contributing to sustainable management of
CPRs are generally efficient in nature because only the efficient ones can survive by way of crowding
out all the inefficient ones (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) irrespective of the social outcomes
(Biswas and Venkatachalam, 2010).
Therefore, by relaxing some of the assumptions such as unbounded rationality and information
availability and maintaining others like the concept of efficiency i.e. minimization of transaction costs,
the new institutional economics approach can deal with a large range of phenomena, are water resource
management, including economic, political and social considerations (Sharma, 2012). The next section
discusses in more detail the theories of transaction cost economics and collective action, the 4 level
institutional framework by Williamson (2000) and the robustness of self-organized common-property
institutions by Ostrom (1990).

6
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Figure 2. Branches of the New Institutional Economics Approach. Source: Kherallah and Kirsten (2001)

2.2 Levels of institutions (Williamson)
The NIE approach distinguishes between informal and formal institutional environment and
between institutional environment and institutions of governance. This is evident in Figure 3, where the
4 level of institutions by Williamson (2000) is depicted. The solid arrows that connect a higher with a
lower level indicate that the higher level imposes constraints on the level immediately below, whereas
the reverse arrows that connect lower with higher levels are dashed and signal feedback (Williamson,
2000). The top level (Level 1) is the informal institutional environment which includes the customs,
traditions and norms, which change very slowly. The next level (Level 2) is the formal institutional
environment, which includes the constitution, the legal system, judiciary, polity, and property and
contract rights. Level 2 introduces the “formal rules” of the game and opens up the opportunity for
first-order economizing: get the formal rules of the game right (Williamson, 2000). “The play of the
game” (Level 3) is the economic organization of contracts and governance structures; market, quasi7
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market, and hierarchical modes of contracting, more generally of managing transaction costs and
seeing economic activity through to completion (Patibandla, 2012). Level 3 opens up the opportunity
for second-order economizing: get the governance structures right (Williamson, 2000). The fourth level
is the level at which neo-classical analysis works e.g. evolution of resource allocation and employment
and changes continuously. The 4-level institutional analysis by Williamson can be used as a framework
to evaluate the performance of institutions for water reform related aspects and moreover, to allow for
the establishment of new and better “pathways for reform” of water resource management policies in
the face of looming water related problems (Sharma, 2012). Section 3 discusses the application of this
framework to the Australian experience, the Murray-Darling basin where several water reforms
occurred with respect to the definition of water rights, development of water markets and allocations,
and to cope with water over-allocation problems. Recommendations for further improving the water
trading mechanism in the Murray-Darling basin are briefly discussed as well.

Figure 3.Four-Levels of institutions: Source: Williamson (2000) and Sharma (2012).
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2.3 Robust design for self-organized common-property institutions (Ostrom)
Ostrom (1990) in Governing the Commons illustrated eight key design principles related to
long-term robustness of institutions created to govern common-pool resource systems1. Examples of
common-pool resources include both natural and human-made systems including: groundwater basins,
irrigation systems, forests, grazing lands, mainframe computers, government and corporate treasuries
(Ostrom, 2001). Examples of the resource units derived from common-pool resources include water,
timber, fodder, computer-processing units, and budget allocations (Blomquist & Ostrom, 1985 and
Ostrom, 2001). The analytical framework to long-term robustness of institutions for governing
sustainable resources developed by Ostrom (1990) is illustrated in Table 1.

1. Clearly Defined Boundaries: The boundaries of the resource system (e.g., irrigation system
or fishery) and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units are clearly
defined.
2. Proportional Equivalence between Benefits and Costs: Rules specifying the amount of
resource products that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring
labour, material, and/or money inputs.
3. Collective-Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by harvesting and protection
rules are included in the group who can modify these rules.
4. Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at
least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.
5. Graduated Sanctions: Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, from
officials accountable to these users, or from both.
6. Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms: Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost,
local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize: The rights of users to devise their own
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term
tenure rights to the resource.
For resources that are parts of larger systems:
8. Nested Enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution,
and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
Table 1. Design principles for governing sustainable resources derived from long-enduring
studies of institutions. Source: Ostrom (1990, 2009).
Common-pool resources produce finite quantities of resource units and one person’s use subtracts from the quantity of
resource units available to others (Ostrom, 1994, 2001).

1
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The first design principle requires that the boundaries of the resource systems and the property
rights of individuals are clearly defined. This principles ensures that participants know who is in or out
of a defined set of relationships and therefore with whom to co-operate (Ostrom, 2009). The second
principle refers to the rules that need to be well specified so that benefits and costs are allocated
proportionally to the participants. If some users pay low costs but obtain high benefits over time, then
the willingness by others to participate and follow the rules reduces. The third principle denotes that the
users can participate in the process of making and modifying the rules, whereas the fourth principle is
about the enforcement of rules and monitoring of the resource condition by the government or locally
by the self-organized resource regimes. The fifth principle refers to the penalties that must be imposed
when a user violates the rules and obtains benefits in the burden of others. Ostrom (2005, 2009) states
that the first five principles work together. For instance, when the participants of a resource system
make their own rules (collective action agreements) that are imposed and monitored by local users
(monitoring) employing punishments for breaking up the rules (graduated sanctions) that clearly define
who has rights to abstract from a well-defined resource (clearly defined boundaries) and that effectively
assign costs proportionate to benefits (proportional equivalence between benefits and costs), then
collective action and monitoring problems can be solved in a reinforcing manner (Ostrom, 2005 and
2009). Moreover, the sixth principle states that systems with low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms
are more likely to survive, whereas the seventh principle suggests that external government agencies do
not challenge the right of local users to create their own institutions (Cox et al., 2010). The last
principle for robust systems postulates that the rules for instance, to allocate water among larger parts
of a resource system may differ from those established for small or single parts. Therefore, among
long-enduring self-governed regimes, smaller-scale organizations can be nested in ever-larger
organizations (Ostrom, 2009).
The eight general principles for robust systems were reviewed and updated by Cox et al (2010)
based on the results from an analysis of almost 100 studies which applied Ostrom’s principles for
managing common-pool resources. The improvements are related to the principles 1, 2 and 4. The
design principle 1 is separated into two parts. The first one is on user boundaries where clear and
locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are present, and the second part is
on resource boundaries where clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a
larger social-ecological system are present. The design principle 2 is also split into two parts,
10
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congruence with local conditions and appropriation and provision. The former states that appropriation
and provision rules are congruent with local and social environmental conditions, whereas the latter
suggests that appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules, i.e. the distribution of costs is
proportional to the distribution of benefits. Finally, the design principle 4 distinguishes between
monitoring users and the resource. The former refers to individuals who monitor the appropriation and
provision levels of users, whereas the latter refers to individuals who monitor the condition of the
resource. Ostrom (2010) suggested that the improvements in the design principles 1, 2 and 4, together
with the other principles, are robust and can ensure the probability of long term survival of an
institution developed by the users of a resource.
Moreover, Ostrom’s further work focused on designing principles to deal with economic and
environmental challenges that could result in the sustainability of common pool resources. She
especially highlighted the problems with “the tragedy of commons” (see Hardin, (1968)), which occurs
as a perceived lack of incentive to keep the quality and quantity of the commons with a view towards
long term sustainable usage. The latter necessary entails an acknowledgment that the resource is finite
in the short term and only infinite in the long term if measures are taken to ensure that the resource can
renew itself (Sharma, 2012). The lack of incentives can lead to over-use and eventually deterioration of
the quantity and quality of the common resource. Therefore, Ostrom (1997 and 2001) provided an
analytical framework that describes the conditions under which self-governing/localized government
institution can form and manage successfully a common pool resource. These conditions which are
displayed in Table 2 are separated into attributes of the resource and of the appropriators, i.e. users that
withdraw resource units like water from a common pool resource.

Attributes of the Resource:
R1. Feasible improvement: Resource conditions are not at a point of deterioration such that it is useless to
organize or so underutilized that little advantage results from organizing.
R2. Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource system are frequently available at a
relatively low cost.
R3. Predictability: The flow of resource units is relatively predictable.
R4. Spatial extern: The resource system is sufficiently small, given the transportation and communication
technology in use that appropriators can develop accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal
microenvironments.
11
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Attributes of the Appropriators:
A1. Salience: Appropriators are dependent on the resource system for a major portion of their livelihood.
A2. Common understanding: Appropriators have a shared image of how the resource system operates
(attributes RI, 2, 3, and 4 above) and how their actions affect each other and the resource system.
A3. Low Discount rate: Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to future benefits to be
achieved from the resource.
A4. Trust and Reciprocity: Appropriators trust one another to keep promises and relate to one another with
reciprocity.
A5. Autonomy: Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external authorities
countermanding them.
A6. Prior organizational experience and local leadership: Appropriators have learned at least minimal skills
of organization and leadership through participation in other local associations or learning about ways that
neighbouring groups have organized.
Table 2. Attributes of the resource and appropriators for self-governing of common pool resources. Source: Ostrom
(1997 and 2001)

Ostrom (1997) concluded that robust, long-living self-governing systems could work if the
resource system is sufficiently small and appropriators can develop precise knowledge of external
boundaries and internal microenvironments (R4) and the flow of resource units is relatively predictable
(R3). With respect to the attributes of the appropriators, important components are a common
understanding among the appropriators, which includes knowledge about the operation of the resource
system and the effect of each other actions (A2) and the establishment of trust and reciprocity among
appropriators (A4). The analytical framework depicted in Table 2 was further developed by Ostrom
(2007) to include the ecological aspect of governing a common pool resource, therefore called socialecological systems (SES). Ostrom provided a multi-tier framework with seven variables (see Table 3)
to analyze how attributes of a resource system (e.g. lake, river), the resource units generated by that
system (e.g. water), the users of that system, and the governance system, jointly impact the interactions
and outcomes obtained at a particular time and place and how these may influence and be influenced
by larger or smaller socioeconomic and political settings in which they are embedded as well as by a
larger or smaller social-ecological systems.

12
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Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)
S1- Economic development. S2- Demographic trends. S3- Political stability.
S4- Government settlement policies. S5- Market availability
Resource System (RS)

Governance System (GS)

RS1- Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish)

GS1- Government organizations

RS2- Clarity of system boundaries

GS2- Non-government organizations

RS3- Size of resource system

GS3- Network structure

RS4- Human-constructed facilities

GS4- Property-rights systems

RS5- Productivity of system

GS5- Operational rules

RS6- Equilibrium properties

GS6- Collective-choice rules

RS7- Predictability of system dynamics

GS7- Constitutional rules

RS8- Storage characteristics

GS8- Monitoring & sanctioning processes

RS9- Location
Resource Units (RU)

Users (U)

RU1- Resource unit mobility

U1- Number of users

RU2- Growth or replacement rate

U2- Socioeconomic attributes of users

RU3- Interaction among resource units

U3- History of use

RU4- Economic value

U4- Location

RU5- Size

U5- Leadership/entrepreneurship

RU6- Distinctive markings

U6- Norms/social capital

RU7- Spatial & temporal distribution

U7- Knowledge of SES/mental models
U8- Dependence on resource
U9- Technology used

Interactions (I)

Outcomes (O)

I1- Harvesting levels of diverse users

O1- Social performance measures

I2- Information sharing among users

(e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability)

I3- Deliberation processes

O2- Ecological performance measures

I4- Conflicts among users

(e.g., overharvested, resilience, diversity)

I5- Investment activities

O3- Externalities to other SESs

I6- Lobbying activities
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1- Climate patterns. ECO2- Pollution patterns. ECO3- Flows into and out of focal SES.
Table 3. Muti-tier variables in framework for analyzing a social-ecological system (SES). Source: Ostrom (2007).

13
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3. International Experiences from Water Markets
3.1 Water Markets in Australia
The theories described in the previous sections have recently been applied in the MurrayDarling (M-D) river basin in Australia by Sharma (2012) where the performance of water reforms and
institutions is evaluated over time. The author also provided further recommendations on how to
improve the water trading in this basin, and eventually, a new robust water governance model, which
can fulfil economic, political, social and environmental objectives.
According to the four level analysis of institutions by Williamson (2000), the water reforms in
Australia till ‘90s, were focused more on level 4, i.e. on the development of water resource allocations
(using the markets as a mean for allocating water). Less attention therefore was paid to make water
reforms to address the levels 1, 2 and 3, i.e. to define the informal and formal rules and play of the
game, for instance, water right systems and water allocation procedures or even to change social
attitudes towards water, for instance, by focusing on making improvements in water quality and
environment (Sharma, 2012). The situation, however, changed after 1990, with the reforms induced by
the Council of the Australian Governments (COAG) in 1994 which were brought within the National
Competition Policy, the Murray Darling “cap” to limit water diversions and eventually to National
Water Initiative (NWI) and National Plan for Water Security (NPWS) in 2004. For the purposes of this
study, we are focusing only on these reforms because we believe that they can be considered as robust
for the sustainability of the water resources and the well-functioning of the water markets.
In 1994, the COAG agreement included several important recommendations. Increasing
emphasis was placed on the development of water markets and improving water allocation
arrangements with a special attention to environmental usage (Sharma, 2012, McCay, 2005). The
former included recommendations for separation of water licenses from land title, allowing water
access entitlements and allocations to be deployed to uses generating greater economic returns (COAG,
1994, Young and McCoil, 2002 and 2003). This was the first step to robust institutional arrangements
for water allocation and management and as Young and McCoil (2002, 2003) suggested, the clue to the
robust resolution of many of Australia’s water resource problems lied more with separation than in
integration2. With respect to improving water allocation arrangements for environmental usage, it was
2

Young and McCoil (2002, 2003) suggested that robust institutional arrangements for water management and allocation
could be achieved based on Tinbergen principle (1950), which states that to attain a given number of independent policy
targets through time there must be, at least, an equal number of policy instruments. Therefore, the components of the

14
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suggested that environmental requirements should be taken into account and the environment should be
treated as a legitimate user of water. Both changes recommended by the COAG agreement and further
adopted by the National Competition Policy act on level 2 and 3 institutions (Williamson), as the
“formal” rules (Institutional Environment) and “play of the game” (Governance) were clearly and welldefined. They can also be defined as robust in accordance with Ostrom’s design principles 1 and 2 (or
equivalently, the updated list suggested by Cox et al. 2010 and further approved by Ostrom as well).
Unbundling commenced in 2000 in the State of New South Wales and was formally required under the
National Water Initiative established in 2004. The term “property right”, was redefined and described
as “water access entitlement” as it was easier to talk about the nature of each person’s entitlement and
avoid getting tangled up in debates about the nature of people’s rights (Young, 2011). Young (2011)
summarizes the robust unbundling water allocation regime as follows. Access entitlements took the
form of a share and were usually issued in perpetuity. Once the system was set up the only way to
secure an entitlement to a share of water in a system was to purchase a share from an existing
shareholder. Ownership of entitlements was vested in individuals and arrangement put in place to
enable water to be traded from one irrigation district to another. Allocation trades were implemented by
debiting one person’s water account and crediting another person’s water account. Entitlement trades
were implemented by amending names on a water entitlement register. Entitlements could be
mortgaged and finally, brokers were employed to bring buyers and sellers together and dealt with each
trade.
In addition to this, the introduction of a ceiling, called “cap” in 1994, for diversions from the
Murray-Darling river system aimed to protect and enhance the riverine environment and eventually, to
meet ecological and social needs. This reform placed the environment at the centre of policy making
process (level 1 and 2 institutions) and affected the governance rules (level 3 institutions) for water
allocation (Sharma, 2012). It can also be defined as robust according to Ostrom’s design principle 4
(monitoring or equivalently, monitoring the resource). Moreover, the National Water Initiative
established in 2004 although focusing on water markets and trading, can be considered as the first

existing allocation licensing regime would be robust if they are separable from each other. Moreover, based on Tinbergen
principle, Young (2012) in a recent report suggests a new robust allocation licensing mechanism for the England and Wales,
where an unbundling regime would include a long-term tradeable entitlement issued in perpetuity, a short-term tradeable
allocation and a non-tradeable use, abstraction and discharge permit.
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initiative that attempts to cover 2, 3 and 4 by including key policy areas such as best practice water
pricing and institutional arrangements, water resource accounting, water access entitlements and
planning framework and community partnerships and adjustment (National Water Commission,
2007b). Although the NWI can be denoted as robust based on Ostrom’s design principle 1, it did not
address other important components such as mechanisms to deal with conflicts between unaffected
parties (Ostrom’s design principle 6) or to improve the participation in the water markets (Sharma,
2012). Finally, the National Plan for Water Security (NPWS) addressed the over-allocation problems3
which were created by the development of water markets with a purpose of guaranteeing that
environmental assets received an appropriate allocation of water for regeneration. This reform, where
the government buybacks entitlements for water allocation for the environment, can be considered as a
change to level 1 and 2 institutions since the environment is the centre of policy making process and
robust in accordance with Ostrom’s principle 4 (monitoring or equivalently, monitoring the resource).
Moreover, Sharrma (2012) further applied Ostrom’s analytical framework with respect to the
attributes of the resources and appropriators (see at Table 2) in the Murray-Darling river basin. The
author stated that the M-D basin is sufficiently large and the flow of resource units is not predictable
and there is no common understanding and trust among the appropriators. In contrast, there is room for
feasible improvement in the resource system, reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the
resource system are frequently available at a relatively low cost. Moreover, the appropriators are
dependent on the resource system for a major portion of their livelihood, they use a sufficiently low
discount rate in relation to future benefits to be achieved from the resource and have learnt at least
some minimal skills of organization through participating in other local associations.
Overall, it is concluded that it is of great importance an increased level of priority for
establishing the informal and formal rules of the game and the play of the game to satisfy robust design
principles for sustainable use of resources and then the markets can be used as a mean to allocate water.
Sharma (2012) moved a step forward by providing some policy recommendations with respect to the
improvement of water markets in the Murray-Darling river basin. The first proposal refers to the
establishment of market entry restrictions in the temporary market trade only and not to the permanent
trade in order to avoid market distortions created by the “activation of sleeper entitlements”4. The
3

Over-allocation occurs when not enough water is allocated for environmental “regeneration”.
Sleeper entitlements are those entitlements that were not previously used. Once the water trading occurs, it is likely that
the users of those entitlements would be willing to take part in the market to obtain some financial gain (Sharma, 2012).
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advantage of the first proposal lies on the fact that there could be a better specification of the nature and
number of participants in the temporary trade. The second proposal refers to the reduction in
institutional transaction costs such as the time taken to process different types of water trading
(permanent and temporary). For instance, currently the approval time for water access allocation varies
across the basin, from 7 days in Queensland and 30 working days in New South Wales and South
Australia. The final suggestion is related to the reduction of monetary transaction costs, e.g.
administrative costs, water use monitoring and enforcement costs by introducing uniformity of fees and
charges across different jurisdictions. This proposal could incentivize participants between different
states to take part in trade. For instance, as it stands now, in the New South Wales the application fee
for approval for temporary and permanent trade is $75 and $250 respectively, whereas the fee for
registration of trade is $73.25 for the permanent trade. Moreover, in South Australia, the application fee
for approval for temporary and permanent trade is even higher, $205 and $349 respectively, whereas in
Victoria the application fee for approval for temporary and permanent trade is $70 and $150
respectively, and the fee for registration of trade is $101 in the case of a permanent trade. With respect
to dealing with conflicts between disaffected parties in the M-D basin, it has been proposed a shift
towards more centralised approach. This implies that the Federal government should be responsible for
the rules and the play of the game, with consultation from the state level representatives, whereas the
responsibility of water resource allocation would reside with the state governments (Sharma, 2012).
Although there were several robust institutional arrangements in the M-D basin for water
allocation and management, water over-allocation problems occurred and now the environment is on
the centre of attention for the policy makers. Therefore, a new robust governance model for the
Murray-Darling river basin must be introduced. According to Rogers (2002), governance refers to “the
capability of a social system to mobilize energies, in a coherent manner, for the sustainable
development of water resources and includes: i) the ability to design public policies (and to mobilize
social resources for their support) which are socially accepted, whose goal is the sustainable
development and use of water resources; and: ii) to make their implementation effective by the
different actors/stakeholders involved in the process” (Solanes, 2012). In the case of the M-D river
basin, the new robust governance model – based on the theories of Williamson, North and Coase on
institutions and transaction cost economics, and Ostrom’s work on robust institutions (Tables 1 and 3)should give the environment the highest priority in the policy making process and implementation, and
second priority should be given to social and economic needs which then can denote the role the
17
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political components needs to play in facilitating the realization of the environmental, social and
economic objectives (Sharma, 2012).

3.2 Water markets in California and Colorado (USA)
This section discusses the water markets and legal change in California based on the study by
Brewer et al. (2008) where the New Institutional Economics approach is implemented. The section also
includes a discussion of the development of water markets in Colorado where inter-sectoral transfers
had positive impacts from an environmental, economic, and social perspective. The empirical evidence
is based on the studies by Howe and Goemans (2003) and Howe (2011) and the water reforms were
evaluated based on the framework analysed in the previous sections.
Following the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach, Brewer et al. (2008) looked into
the interactions among regulation, property rights, and water markets in California over the period
1987–2005. The authors examined whether and how the definition of water rights and the regulation of
water transfers have affected observed market activity in the extent and pattern of water trades and their
duration, and the nature of the contracts used (short-term leases, long-term leases, and sales). Over the
period of study, the authors identified the changes in law that either strengthened or weakened property
rights to water and raised or lowered the transaction costs of trading. It was mentioned that the greatest
activity for legal change to support water markets were in the years 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1999, and
2003, whereas changes that limited water markets occurred in 1988, 1999, and 2001 (for more detail
see Brewer et al., 2008). For instance, in 1991 the Drought Water Bank of California was created to
facilitate temporary transfers of water from agricultural to the urban sector, at a single price set by the
state government, through different types of contracts (Level 3 institutions) (Rey et al, 2012). The
results indicated that most active and subsequently robust factors in support of markets were making
the water right more precise such as defining beneficial use to include trading activities, allowing for
the transfer of water rights, separating water from the land for trading, and defining conservation and
the trading of conserved water. In contrast, the most active factors limiting water markets were
restrictions on transfers to protect other water users, restrictions to protect the environment, requiring
third-party compensation, requiring notice of transfers, and allowing for third-parties to protest and
challenge proposed transfers (Brewer et al., 2008).
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Moreover, in western USA, water rights are defined as appropriation rights meaning that they
are obtained on the basis of beneficial use rather than land ownership (Hodgson, 2006). Under the
appropriation system of water rights, all water withdrawn from the natural setting is represented by a
“water right” or by a groundwater pumping permit, owned by individuals, municipalities or water
companies, and the shares of these organizations can be therefore bought or sold (Howe and Goemans,
2003). This type of rights is in contrast to the riparian rights which refer to the situation where both
land and water need to be purchased if water is used for another purpose. Below we will focus on the
characteristics of the water rights, and the benefits from intersectoral trading between the two regions
of the Colorado basin- the South Platte and Arkansa- where water is transferred through the federal
Colorado-Big Thompson (C-BT) project.
As part of the above mentioned project, the Northern Colorado Water Conservation District
(NCWCD) was founded with the responsibility of carrying out the diversion works of the project and
the allocation of water on the eastern side of the mountains (Howe, 2011). The U.S. government
continued to be the owner of the water but the District owned the right to allocate all the water made
available by the C-BT project as long as it was meeting repayment obligations and was operating and
maintaining the project facilities as stipulated in the repayment contract (World Bank, 1999). NCWCD
shares have unique characteristics that make water trading activities very attractive. Firstly, they are
homogeneous units meaning that each share gets the same amount of water and there are no priorities
(Level 2 institutions). For instance, the amounts of transfers were annually collected and were
classified by size and nature of seller and buyer (e.g. agricultural to urban or agricultural to
agricultural). Secondly, the water district holds the rights to all return-flows and thirdly, transfers do
not have to pass through the water court but require only the approval of the NCWCD board (Level 3
institutions) (Howe and Goemans, 2003, Molle and Berkoff, 2009). Therefore, in this case well-defined
property rights strengthened the development of water resource allocations and kept the transactional
costs low resulting in significant economic and environmental benefits for the participants.
The results indicated that the economic impact, both directly and indirectly, per acre foot of
water transferred from agricultural to urban uses within the basins, was very positive. Moreover,
although there was an increasing rate of share of ownership over time for the cities and industry, the
share in actual use is not increasing rapidly as cities “rent” some of their water back to agriculture on
an annual basis, subject to recall in drought years (Howe and Goemans, 2003). The volume and
direction of rentals depend on weather conditions, for instance, during drought period cities may
19
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withhold water from agriculture and charge higher prices (Howe, 2011). Also, the NCWD preserved
the water resources by paying attention to the preservation of productivity of agriculture lands, water
quality in soil, aquifers and maintenance of ecosystem services. Hence, within the Colorado-BigThompson system, robust institutional arrangements such as the homogeneous nature of water shares
and the avoidance of water court review approval for water transfers, allowed buyers and sellers to
carry out small transactions as the need arises rather than occasional large transfers. It is therefore
concluded that the efficient and continuous water market within the Colorado-Big-Thompson system
fulfils Ostrom’s design principles 1, 2, 4 and 6. New institutions, i.e. well-defined property rights, were
successfully adapted to the specific circumstances and needs of the region (local level), homogeneity of
water shares allowed water transfers among groups with the same needs and concerns and fostered the
protection of the open-access resources; finally, any water transfer approval was dealt locally (Ostrom,
1990, Ostrom et al. 1993, and Ostrom and Gardner, 1993). However, considerable attention needs to be
paid to the case when there is an out of basin water transfer. If the region where the water is taken from
is economically depressed, then a water transfer might cause difficulties in its financial vitality (e.g.
loss in agriculture production, income, employment). Therefore, a transfer fee per acre foot could be
imposed on the buyer and transferred to a unit of general government in the area of origin to support
social services during the period of transition (Howe and Goemans, 2003 and Howe, 2011).

3.3 Water markets in Chile
This section discusses the development of water markets in Chile based on the study by
Donoso (2011) evaluating the water reforms based on the new institutional economics approach
analyzed in the previous sections. In Chile, the government introduced neo-liberal economic policies
which supported private property rights and free markets through the establishment of the National
Water Code (WC). The 1981 WC maintained water as “national property for public use”, separated
rights from land and granted transferable water-use rights (WUR) to individuals through the
Directorate General of Water (Dirección General de Aguas, DGA). The WUR allow a person to have a
certain water flow of a river or aquifer with a cap. When the level of water flow of the river or aquifer
is not sufficient to satisfy the WUR that have been granted, then these WUR act as shares (i.e. certain
% of river flow or maximum cap in the case of an aquifer). The WUR are not sector specific and can be
transferred among sectors such as from agriculture to sanitation, industry, mining etc. Delving into the
definition of water rights, according to the resource availability, they are divided into permanent and
20
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temporary and according to the time of the use of the resource the rights are classified into continuous,
discontinuous and alternated. Also, depending on the use of the flow, consumptive (irrigation) and nonconsumptive (hydropower) water rights are also defined (Rey et al., 2012). This means that nonconsumptive (e.g. hydropower) use rights allow the owner to divert water from a river with the
obligation to return the same water unaltered to its original channel. Consumptive use rights do not
require that the water be returned once it has been used (Donoso, 2011). The WC 1981 did not address
any environmental sustainable policies (third-party effects and environmental impacts) except in 2005
when it was reformed to consider regulation for the establishment of minimum ecological flows.
However, the registration of water rights was not adequate. There is a significant number of rights with
no record although they are in use and exercise. The lack of legal certainty of water rights and the
absence of a system to identify the current right holders in a given watershed or river section are the
main difficulties that authorities have to face to make efficient functioning of water markets in the
country (Rey et al. 2012).
Moreover, the 1981 WC clearly separated the role of the government from the private sector.
As far as the Government Bodies are concerned, the role of State in water management is mainly
focused on measuring and determining the availability of water resources and on protecting natural
resources, the impact assessment service and environmental legislation. The Directorate General of
Water (Dirección General de Aguas, DGA) is responsible for granting, monitoring and enforcing of
WUR. It has very little regulatory authority over private water use and can’t cancel or restrict water
rights once they have been granted (Rey et al. 2012). Finally, the management of water in day to day
decisions and issues is carried out by the User’ organizations. Different types of User’s associations
exist. The first one operates on natural resources, rivers, and aquifers, whereas the second one is
responsible for the distribution of water in channels. These organizations do not own water rights,
however, they have arbitration powers and represent members against third parties. Thus, any entity
holding water rights must join any organization or association established in the Water Code (Rey et
al., 2012).
Empirical evidence in assessing the efficiency of water markets in Chile indicated that the
volume traded remained limited but reallocation has performed reasonably well, even though third
party effects and speculative behaviour reduced efficiency (Mole and Berkoff, 2009). Grafton et al.
(2010) pointed out that 8 to 32% of the agricultural sector’s contribution to regional GDP, $22 million
annually, can be attributed to water markets. However, there is an uneven spread of pricing information
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in the market that particularly disadvantages market participants with fewer resources and also
increases transaction costs. Donoso (2012) suggested that the allocation framework based on a market
allocation system established by the 1981 Water Code has been efficient from an investment point of
view, as several economic sectors undertake significant investments to improve water use efficiency
and to increase the availability of groundwater through exploration. Likewise, the free transaction of
water use rights, even though in many areas water use rights markets have not been very active,
constitutes an efficient reallocation mechanism which has facilitated the reallocation of granted rights
(Donoso, 2012).
Although the Water Act in 1981 defined the rules of the game (Level 2 institutions) and its
subsequent amendment in 2005 to consider regulation for the establishment of minimum ecological
flows to improve water allocation arrangements for environmental usage (Level 3 institutions), their
implementation was not effective. Therefore, we can’t consider the Chilean water market as robust due
to the lack of proper registration of water rights, high transaction costs or conflicts between upstream
and downstream users over the return flows, with the exception of unbundling the rights from land.
Therefore, the effectiveness of water markets in Chile could be enhanced by employing more robust
changes which could overcome the following difficulties. Firstly, data on WUR transactions and prices
for buyers and sellers is needed to overcome the lack of WUR and WUR market information.
Secondly, WUR needs to be clearly specified, ownership secure and formally registered. Thirdly, the
existence of transaction costs can be dealt with collecting information on water transactions, water right
prices and water market activity. Finally, a rapid and efficient controversy resolution system to solve
conflicts among water users needs to be further developed (Donoso, 2011).

3.4 Water markets in Spain
This section evaluates the performance of water reforms to facilitate inter-sectoral water
transfers in the Tagus river basin in Spain based on the study by IMDEA (2011) where Williamson’s
four-levels of institutions scheme is implemented. An overview of the legal, institutional and
environmental barriers to water markets in Spain is also provided in this section.
Water use rights are defined by the abstraction point, type of use, calendar, plots and crops to be
irrigated and irrigation technologies, usable volume or flow and return flows (Garrido et al. 2012). The
type of use, location, abstraction or return points cannot be changed without an explicit approval by the
River Basin Agency (RBA) (Rey et al. 2012). Rights differ in the priority of their access to water
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depending on the type of use (domestic, environmental, agricultural, hydropower or industrial) (Rey et
al., 2012, Calatrava et al. 2012). During the drought events in the Tagus river basin, in 1993 and 2002,
two water transfers occurred, from irrigators to urban suppliers. In the first case, water was transferred
from irrigators in the Henares Canal to provide drinking water to several towns supplied by the
Mancomunidad de Aguas del Sorbe (MAS) (Sorbe Water Community) (with Alcala des Henares being
the most important town). In the second case, water was transferred to the city of Madrid from
irrigators of the Alberche river.
Both water transfers addressed the fourth level of Williamson’s institutions as their aim was to
allocate water from low to high value users. These water transfers were allowed thanks to the reform of
the Water Law in 1999 (Law 46/1999) which introduced the so-called water right lease contracts
(contratos de cesión) and water banks (centros de intercambio) that eased certain transfers of water
rights for a given period of time including a pecuniary compensation (IMDEA, 2012). However, in the
case of transferring water from the irrigator areas of the Alberche river to the city of Madrid, no clear
and well-defined registration of the irrigators water rights was available a priori. As a result, not all
farmers were able to participate in the trading process. In 2005, the government with a decree (RDL
15/2005) allowed water users adjoin to public irrigation land to sign transfer contracts, provided some
conditions were met (IMDEA, 2011). The 1999 and 2005 water reforms can be considered as changes
on level 2 and 3 institutions (Williamson), as the “formal” rules (Institutional Environment) and “play
of the game” (Governance). Also, the 1999 water reform defined that water transfers need to be
approved by the administration which can be time consuming, requiring up to two months. Moreover,
the river basin authority can reject a water transfer if it concludes that negative impacts on the
environment and water resource might occur. With respect to the drought events in 1993 and 2002, the
Ministry of the Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs (MARM) and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fishing and Food Affairs were involved in the regulatory process (IMDEA, 2011). This legal reform
addressed level 3 institutions with the government playing an important role in the whole process,
though concerns about high transaction costs might rise.
Although these legal reforms attempted to define the rules and play of the game to facilitate the
implementation of water trading in Spain, they can’t be considered as robust since there are still
considerable barriers to trade, which Garrido et al. (2012) split into legal, institutional and
environmental. The legal barriers include market barriers, e.g. the number of buyers and sellers and
barriers related to the definition of water rights e.g. rights to consumptive uses cannot be sold to
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holders for non-consumptive uses (hydropower) and vice versa. Institutional barriers include regional
and intersectoral barriers that occur when representatives of one sector collectively fights exchanges
that go against their political standing within the hierarchy of water rights and political priorities
(Garrido et al. 2012). Finally, as far as environmental barriers are concerned, these are those enforced
by public agencies responsible for the ecological quality of rivers and water bodies. For instance, the
minimum environmental river flows, are based on modeling evidence, which are hardly contested
(Garrido et al. 2012).
Rey et al. (2012) and Garrido et al. (2012) give a comprehensive overview of the water market
activities in Spain, which include informal trading of surface water resources, trading of private
groundwater rights, formal lease contracts, purchase of land to use water in other parts of the basin,
inter-basin water trading and public exchange centers/water banks and option contracts. Also, IMDEA
(2012) provides empirical evidence about the water trading activities from one basin to another such as
in the Tagus-Segura interconnected basins, emphasizing that there are significant legal restrictions and
they are mostly limited to emergency periods. The following section provides a list of robust
recommendations for improving the water trading schemes in Spain and a new robust governance
model for sustainable water resource and use for this country.

4. Policy Recommendations
We believe that the analysis conducted in this study can be a valuable roadmap for
understanding which factors weaken or strengthen the development of water markets, and how they
could be further developed to be environmental, social and economic accepted. Therefore, combining
together the lessons learned from the Spanish and international experience from the evolution of water
markets, we provide robust recommendations for improving the water trading schemes in Spain. These
include: 1) Climatic, geologic and hydraulic information for the definition of water rights; 2)
Registration institutions to record water rights; 3) Unbundling water allocation and management
regime; 4) Flexibility in water transfers; 5) Recognize the environment as legitimate water user e.g. by
establishing guidelines for minimum environmental flows (see Katz, 2012 for more detail), avoid
external effects on third parties e.g. return flows or over-allocation problems.
The definition of secure water rights allows for the development of water markets. Clear
information of how much water is allowed for abstraction, use and minimum ecological flows, within a
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defined period and location and registration of these rights increases transparency. An unbundling
allocation licensing regime allows changes in water reforms to be target specific. In other words, each
component is defined in a manner that enables decisions about one component to be made without
consideration of implications for other components because each component is defined in a
hydrologically and legally robust manner (Young, 2012). Unbundling, coupled with verification of
registers, could therefore maintain transactional costs low and enable water trading.
Moreover, flexible water transfers, from one sector to another, for instance from agriculture to
urban, industry and energy, and between non-consumptive and consumptive uses could facilitate water
trading from low to higher-value uses. For instance, the reform in the 2010 Andalusian Water Law
allowed changes in the priority system, meaning that irrigators are on the same level with other users
such as industries and therefore, exchanges between these users are permitted (Garrido et al., 2012).
Another example is illustrated by Gomez (2012). In the case of Mallorca, the possibility of the water
supply firm to buy rights from farmers in dry years is showed to avoid the cost of infrastructures such
as dams and desalination plants required to secure the supply of drinking water. This way water trading
allows supply security with lower water tariffs and an income guarantee for farmers in dry periods
(Gomez, 2012).
Furthermore, environment is an important user in the whole process. As Gomez et al. (2012)
emphasized transferring water from one source to another may have external effects on third parties
coming from the fact that farmers in the low part of the basin use the return flows of farmers and other
users utilizing the water upstream, including recycled wastewater and/or discharged cooling water from
power plants, which might be essential to maintain water flows in the river. Therefore, recognizing the
environment as legitimate water user could result in environmental sustainability of the water resource
and in avoiding externalities.
Other recommendations equally important include: 6) Reduction in institutional and monetary
transactional costs, for instance the timing and fee of approval of water trading, 7) Registration
institutions to collect information and data from trading activities, for instance the amounts of transfers
can be collected and be classified by size and nature of seller and buyer. As a result, the perception of
the process, the quality and accessibility of market information and guarantee of market proficiency are
enhanced, 8) The need of cost-benefit analysis, to quantify benefits and externalities, 9) Establishment
of specialist environment courts responsible for resolving disputes concerning water rights which do
not have to be located solely at the level of the water administration but could also foresee specific
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local resource management bodies such as water user associations (Hodgson, 2006). As the users
participate in the administration of water resources, their expertise in local issues may effectively
influence the development of the water market and fairly resolve any disputes which may arise (World
Bank, 1999). 10) Water markets can be particularly successfully if they are localised, meaning that the
new institutions can easily adapt to the specific circumstances of the region. Moreover, if markets are
conducted among homogeneous groups as they share the same concerns and needs compared to
heterogeneous groups. Their expertise can also be important for dealing with local disputes and
environmental sustainability of the water resource.
In addition to the above robust recommendations for improving the water markets in Spain, a
new robust water governance model is proposed. This model is based on Sharma’s (2012) approach but
re-prioritizing its components. A robust governance model for Spain is depicted in Figure 4 and should
include the elements of environmental responsibility, political support and action, social education and
acceptance, effective administrative systems and adaptive governance. Environmental responsibility
implies that environmental guidelines, in relation to how much water is diverted, abstracted or return to
a water resource, needs to be clearly defined by those who have the knowledge to do so e.g.
environmental scientists. Political support is required in the case when water re-allocations are not
beneficial between parties (sectors) or when environmental guidelines are not respected. Together with
political support goes political action which can take the form of social education programs, design and
enforcement of legal rules and establishment of administrative institutions (Sharma, 2012). Social
education and acceptance implies raising awareness of the environmental, economic and social value of
a water resource for both stakeholders and citizens. Effective administrative systems can take the form
of not only recording information related to market activities but also of a dispute resolution
mechanism in case voluntary agreements are not successfully (Sharma, 2012). Finally, adaptive
governance implies that institutional regimes need to be flexible to meet unpredictable conditions, i.e.
to be able to change the rules of the game, for instance to include new scientific knowledge or to apply
a variety of policies in the face of changing conditions (Sharma, 2012, Walker et al. 2002, Drieschova
et al. 2008).
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Figure 4. A New Robust Water Governance Model.

Therefore, as it can be seen from the figure above, the role of the political component is given
the highest priority and second priority is given to environmental, economic and social needs. The
reason for giving the highest priority to the role of political component in the new water governance
model is explained by the fact that the water markets in Spain are weak because of the lack of
transparency in water price-setting, the lack of public information about who uses the water and for
what, the lack of clear conditions in the current legislation about the spatial and temporal restrictions to
trading (Garrido et al., 2012). As a result, legal and political institutions that support clear property
rights, recognize the environment as legitimate user of water, encourage political and social support
and action, will lower the transaction costs of trade and facilitate the smooth exchange of water from
low to higher-value uses, facilitating therefore the realization of environmental, economic and social
objectives.

5. Conclusions
In this paper we reviewed the introduction and development of water markets, based on the new
institutional economics approach, in countries such as in Australia, USA (California and Colorado),
Chile, and in Spain. Based on the theories by Williamson, North, Coase and Ostrom on transaction cost
economics, property and collective actions, we reviewed the evolution of water reforms changes and
identified factors that strengthened or weakened the development of water markets. Based on the
lessons learned from the Spanish and international experience review, we provided a list of robust
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recommendations for the improvement of water markets in Spain, a country in which the absence of
robust water governance and effective surveillance does not allow water markets to be efficient and
socially accepted (Garrido et al. 2012).
The main results from the international review on the evolution of water reforms for water
markets suggest that well-defined rights, appropriate regulation of water markets and changes in beliefs
and notions are preconditions for the development of water markets. Additionally, institutional
representation of the environment is of paramount importance and needs to be included in the robust
design principles for sustainable water resources and well-function of markets. We believe that the
international review on water markets can be a valuable roadmap for understanding why water markets
function or not and how they could be further developed to fulfil environmental, social and economic
objectives. Therefore, a list of robust recommendations for improving water markets in Spain includes
among others not only the definition of secure water rights, for instance, registration of rights or
recognition of environment as a legitimate user, but also the monitoring of water trading activities, for
instance collection of information for prices and quantities or cost-benefit analysis for quantifying
benefits and externalities. Moreover, it is concluded that water transfers can be particularly successful
if they are localised, meaning that the new institutions can easily adapted to the specific circumstances
of the region and if they are conducted among homogeneous groups, as they share the same concerns
and needs compared to heterogeneous groups. Their expertise can also be important for dealing with
local disputes and the environmental sustainability of the water resource. Finally, following the
approach of Sharma (2012) the well-functioning of water markets in Spain would further require the
establishment of a robust water governance model in which environmental responsibility, political
support and action, social education and acceptance, effective administrative systems and adaptive
governance are important components. The highest priority is given to the role of legal and political
institutions and second priority to environmental, economic and social needs.
We hope that the framework presented in this paper will function as a tool for researchers and
policy makers in Spain and other European countries to understand how water markets can be further
developed to be economically and environmentally efficient, and socially accepted.
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